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Abstract
In the Email Game (Amer. Econom. Rev. 79 (1989) 385) noisy information channels may
prevent risky-e!cient coordination, even when the game is almost common knowledge. In this
paper, we show that this is the case whenever message failure probabilities are not su!ciently
di6erent. Quite intuitively, the extent of the di6erence is governed by the game payo6s, and in
particular by the mixed Nash Equilibrium strategy of one of the two games to be played. This
is because, conditionally to having observed one’s type, a player’s beliefs on the opponent’s
choices are governed by the reliability of communication channels.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In a fascinating paper Rubinstein [13] investigated the consequence of a condition of
almost common knowledge, in the Electronic Mail Game (EMG) that two individuals
are playing. The EMG is a Bayesian game where players are di6erently informed on
the relevant strategic form game, which is chosen by nature out of two possible ones.
The depth (degree) of almost common knowledge concerning the game that is being
played is governed by a computer-based communication technology through which the
two players exchange email messages. The main conceptual, and to some extent puz-
zling, point of the Osborne and Rubinstein [12] version of the model is that no matter
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how deep knowledge of the game players might have, the unique Nash Equilibrium
(NE) of the EMG is a pair of strategies specifying that each player chooses, at all
types (and so states), the same action that would be chosen at the unique equilibrium
with no exchange of information. Namely, unless the communication protocol leads
to common knowledge of the game, which by construction in the EMG occurs with
probability zero, no or abundant informational exchange induces the same equilibrium.
At Grst, the theoretical feature of equilibrium uniqueness is remarkable as it is lacking
intuitive appeal, especially when the number of messages sent back and forth by the
two players is very high. However, related experimental work [3] appears instead to
suggest that the Gnding is less counterintuitive than it seems at Grst. More speciG-
cally, the collected empirical evidence indicates that the unique NE may in fact be
conceived as the Gnal outcome of some learning process. Indeed, subjects involved
in this very same strategic situation for a su!ciently high number of repetitions even-
tually exhibited choices consistent with Rubinstein’s equilibrium.
From the point of view of possible real life applications of the model, implemented
to enhance e!cient coordinated choices, the following consideration is unavoidable. If
rational players consider setting up such a device they should also anticipate that it is
pointless as it entails the same choices of the no communication case. Hence, a natural
question to pose is whether or not the same communication protocol could in some
way accommodate agents’ coordination, and if yes how.
A Grst positive answer in this direction was provided by Rubinstein [13] himself.
Indeed in his work he shows how, operating on the technological side, a more intuitive
outcome could arise. In particular he suggests that, under appropriate conditions, im-
posing a commonly known upper bound to the number of exchanged messages might
induce two NE and, in one of them, informational exchange has a role in enhancing
more appropriate coordination. Monderer-Samet [8] modelled almost common knowl-
edge of the game rather than according to Rubinstein’s iterative notion as common
p-belief with p, the probability quantifying the belief, su!ciently close to one. With
this alternative view they showed how e!cient coordination could be obtained, how-
ever, within an approximated (weaker) notion of NE. Hence, their framework too
was unable to identify more rewarding coordination as an exact, indeed standard,
NE. More recently, work by Binmore and Samuelson [2] pointed out that if informa-
tional exchange is either voluntary, or costly or both then e!cient coordination can
take place. Dimitri [4] shows how multiple and more attractive equilibria can emerge,
within a slightly di6erent communication protocol, even when the relevant game is
at most mutually known. Morris [9] instead argued how Rubinstein’s result could be
robust with respect to some speciGc departures from the original version of the model,
such as a more realistic timing structure of the messages. Insightful, and more general,
discussions on the issue are in [10,11].
This paper, departing in a minimal way from the original version of the EMG, inves-
tigates the possibility of improved coordination within a very general communication-
technology framework. As we shall see, this will allow us to identify a theoretical
key point underlying Rubinstein’s results. More speciGcally, as in Rubinstein the pa-
rameter , with 1¿¿0, represents the probability for both players’ computers that
an email message will fail reaching the other machine, we shall consider here the
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situation in which players may also perceive (know) computers to have di6erent failure
probabilities. The analysis was mainly motivated by two basic observations: (a) In Ru-
binstein’s framework no other NE, of the single games deGning the EMG, plays a
role and (b) to obtain the result, no speciGc relationship is asked to hold between the
communication-technology parameters (in that model ) and the payo6s. The common
intuition behind these two points is that the e6ciency of real life communication should
(and seems to) be related to the consequences at stake.
We shall see that the results of this paper provide a fully satisfactory explanation to
the above observations. Indeed, roughly speaking, what we Gnd is that informational
exchange may possibly entail more desirable coordination if and only if (i) for one
of the two players the probability of a successful message is greater than the mixed
strategy equilibrium probability, in one of the two games deGning EMG, of the more
rewarding-risky action and (ii) the opponent has a su!ciently less reliable computer in
sending messages. The game is not zero sum, therefore the opponent is simply another
player.
Nonetheless, even in this more general context, uniqueness of the NE found by Ru-
binstein is still pervasive in terms of probability values; however, what we are now
capable of is to put it into a broad perspective allowing us to understand its very nature.
More speciGcally, uniqueness in Rubinstein could be interpreted as a particular mani-
festation (when message failure probabilities are equal) of a more general phenomenon
established within a well deGned subset of the space of message failure probabilities,
given by the unit square. Outside the above subset there could be multiple equilibria,
including that in which players coordinate almost perfectly (namely except one state
of the world) on the Pareto e!cient NE, regardless of the game chosen by nature.
The results also appear to suggest that for risky-rewarding coordination to emerge
what seems to matter is not so much the depth of the beliefs hierarchy concerning
the game but rather the beliefs on the action that the opponent can take. As these are
supported by the reliability of communication channels our Gndings are not surprising.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we deGne the Generalised Elec-
tronic Mail Game (GEMG), formulate necessary and su!cient conditions for unique-
ness (multiplicity) of Nash Equilibria and discuss ex ante e!ciency. In Section 3 we
investigate an alternative extension of the EMG, the Intermediated Electronic Mail
Game (IEMG), as an example to provide both a possible interpretation as well as an
implementation of the main results in Section 2, when individuals believe message
error probabilities to be the same. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The Generalised Electronic Mail Game (GEMG)
2.1. The game
We refer to the version of the EMG appearing in [12], where two individuals (I and
II) have to play one of the two games depicted in Fig. 1.
The only two possible states of nature are a and b; depending upon the state, one
of the two games will be played. It will either be game Ga, with probability 1 − p,
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A  B 
A M , M 1, -L
B -L, 1 0, 0 
Ga ; probability 1-p
A  B 
A 0, 0 1, -L
B -L, 1 M, M 
L>M>1; p<1/2 
Gb ; probability p
Fig. 1. L¿M¿1; p¡1=2.
or game Gb with probability p. Notice that while Ga has only one (pure strategy) NE
in strictly dominating strategies, the proGle (A; A) Gb has three NE: the pure strategy
proGles (A; A) and (B; B) and the mixed proGle where both players choose A with
probability q=(M − 1)=(L + M − 1)¡ 12 . Hence all equilibria are symmetric and in
playing them individuals have to coordinate on the same action; moreover, they are
Pareto rankable with (B; B) being the most and (A; A) the least preferred among the
three by both players. Notice also that (A; A) is risk dominant, namely the expected
payo6 of both players, when the other chooses A (and so B) with probability 1=2, is
higher when choosing A than choosing B.
After the game has been chosen only I knows with certainty (observes) which one it
is. The two players have computers on their desks to communicate; we indicate them
as Ci, with i= I; II. The communication protocol is as follows. If Ga is selected, then
no message is exchanged between the two machines. If instead Gb is selected, then CI
automatically sends an email message to CII; in Rubinstein’s EMG the message has
probability 1¿¿0 of failing to reach the other machine. If the Grst message arrives,
then CII will automatically reply by sending a conGrmation message with the same
probability 1¿¿0 of not getting through. If CI receives this message it will in turn
send a conGrmation (of a conGrmation) message, still with 1¿¿0 failure probability
and so on. Messages are independent of each other. With probability one communica-
tion eventually stops; the only uncertainty is when it happens. Once stopped, on their
computer screens players will privately read the number of messages sent by their own
machines. Then the EMG is a Bayesian game in which the communication technology
speciGes a common type-space T , the set of natural numbers, namely T = {0; 1; 2; : : :}
given by the number of messages appearing on the screen at the end of the commu-
nication exchange. If S = {A; B} is the pure strategies space in Ga and Gb (for both
agents), then a strategy for player i in the Bayesian game is a function i : T→ [0; 1],
where i(t) indicates the probability with which player i chooses A at type t, with
i= I; II. The state space  will then be a subset of T 2, with the generic state !∈
deGned by a pair of possible types (tI; tII), such that either tI = tII or tI = tII + 1, with
ti being player i’s type.
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To simplify the notation, being a contingent (to one’s type) plan formed before
nature chooses the game, from now on a strategy will be written as
i =
∑
t∈T
i (t)It(ti);
where It(ti)= 1 for ti = t and It(ti)= 0 for ti = t, namely It(ti) is the standard indicator
function. So, for example i = I0(ti) is the strategy for player i specifying to choose A
at type ti =0 and B at all other types.
According to Rubinstein, with probability one the game played will not be common
knowledge; nonetheless, it could be of almost common knowledge should the number
of messages appearing on the screens be su!ciently high.
2.2. Communication and nash equilibria
We start by recalling Rubinstein’s main result; below, 0¡I; II¡1 1 indicate (re-
spectively) the failure message probabilities of CI and CII. From now on we shall
refer to the EMG, where I and II may possibly di6er, as the Generalised Electronic
Mail Game (GEMG). However, before stating the Grst proposition it is worth pointing
out explicitly that the following assumption holds (in an informal way) throughout the
paper.
Assumption. The probabilities 06I(t); II(t)61 are common knowledge between
players.
We shall see below that since in Rubinstein’s work probabilities are equal, their
value plays no role in the main result; due to this, no assumption like the above one
would be needed in that particular case. However, as we hinted at in the introduction,
if players are interested in e!cient coordination then they should make sure to agree
on probabilities being su!ciently di6erent.
Proposition 1 (Osborne and Rubinstein [12]). If II = = I the unique Nash Equilib-
rium of the GEMG is the pair of strategies i = ∗i =
∑
t∈T It(ti), with i= I; II.
Rubinstein shows that playing A, on the part of both agents, is the unique NE also
in absence of the email communication protocol; hence, informational exchange under
the above setting is useless to enhance, in equilibrium, more desirable coordination
when playing Gb. The questions we then want to tackle are (i) whether or not, and if
yes under what requisites, with the possibility of di6erent message failure probabilities
0¡I; II¡1 other equilibria could emerge in the GEMG and (ii) in the case of multiple
equilibria discuss their relative e!ciency. In what follows, as long as some conditions
on error probabilities are satisGed, we shall provide a positive answer to the Grst
question.
1 The more general case of 06I(t); II(t)61, with type-dependent probabilities taking any value in the
closed interval [0,1] will be considered in Section 2.4.
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Below we start focusing on what we consider to be, in terms of the possibility of
more e!cient coordination, a main consequence of introducing di6erent probabilities.
Proposition 2. (1) The pair of strategies i = ∗∗i = I0(ti), with i= I; II, is a Nash
Equilibrium of the GEMG if and only if II¿(1− q)I=[q(1− I)] and I¡q.
(2) The pair of strategies I = ∗∗∗I = I0(tI) + I1(tI) and II = 
∗∗
II is a Nash Equi-
librium of the GEMG if and only if I¿(1− q)II=[(1− II)q] and II¡q, where q=
(M − 1)=(L+M − 1).
Proof. (1) Su6ciency. First consider player I. (i) As well as in the EMG, at tI = 0
choosing A is strictly dominating for I. (ii) At tI = 1 she is uncertain on the true state
being either the pair of types (1, 0) or (1,1). Hence if II plays ∗∗II , namely chooses A
when observes tII = 0 and B otherwise, the (conditional to the type) expected payo6
of I when playing the (mixed strategy) I(1)∈ [0; 1], where as we said I(1) is the
probability of choosing A at type tI = 1, is given by
EI(I(1)|tI = 1) = [I(0I(1)− (1− I(1))L) + (1− I)II(I(1)
+ (1− I(1))M)]=[I + (1− I)II]
= [I(1)(IL− (1− I)II(M − 1))
+ (1− I)IIM − IL]=[I + (1− I)II]:
As II¿(1 − q)I=(1 − I)q the term (IL − (1 − I)II(M − 1)) in the numerator of
the above expression is strictly negative; moreover, since I¡q there exists II in the
interval (0,1) satisfying the Grst inequality. In this case the optimal I(1) is I(1)∗∗=0
which proves this part. (iii) If tI¿1 then since playing B, on the part of both play-
ers, represents a NE of Gb it is clearly optimal for I to play I(tI)∗∗=0 against II
choosing ∗∗II .
Consider now player II. (i) As in the EMG, at tII = 0 playing A is best reply against
∗∗I ; indeed, in this case her expected payo6 will be
EII(II(0)|tII = 0) = ((1− p)[II(0)M − (1− II(0))L]
+pI[II(0) + (1− II(0))M ])=[(1− p) + pI]
= (II(0)[(1− p)(L+M)− pI(M − 1)]
− (1− p)L+ pIM)=[(1− p) + pI]:
Since (1− p)(L+M)− pI(M − 1)¿0 the optimal choice is II(0)∗∗=1.
(ii) At tII¿1, again, since the pair (B; B) is a NE of Gb, it follows that playing B,
for II, is best reply against I playing ∗∗I .
Necessity: If the pair (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) is a NE then, by deGnition, 
∗∗
I is best reply to 
∗∗
II .
But for this to be so at tI = 1, it must be II¿(1− q)I=[q(1− I)] and I¡q.
(2) Su6ciency: Start with I. (i) If I¿(1 − q)II=[q(1 − II)] and II¡q then II¡
qI=[1−q(1− I)] which implies that the Grst component in the conditions of point (1)
is violated with strict inequality; hence, if II plays ∗∗II , it is optimal for I to choose
I(1)∗∗∗=1. (ii) At any tI¿1 playing B is optimal for I against II choosing ∗∗II . Take
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now player II and assume I chooses ∗∗∗I . At tII = 0 the optimal choice is II(0)
∗∗=1,
due to the action pair (A; A) being a NE in both Ga and Gb. At tII = 1 her (conditional)
expected payo6 is
EII(II(1)|tII = 1) = [II(0II(1)− (1− II(1))L) + (1− II)I(II(1)
+ (1− II(1))M)]=[II + (1− II)I]
= [II(1)(IIL− (1− II)I(M − 1))
+ (1− II)IM − IIL]=[II + (1− II)I]:
Since I¿(1− q)II=[q(1− II)] and II¡q, it is optimal for II to choose II(1)∗∗=0.
Moreover, action B is the optimal choice at any tII¿1.
Necessity: It is as in point (1) and the proof is complete.
When conditions in point (1) of the above proposition are met it is II¿I; vice-
versa when those in point (2) hold. Namely improved (ex post) coordination can only
occur if the message failure probability of CI is su6ciently di6erent from that of CII.
The important, and interesting, point here is that it is not enough to have one highly
reliable machine, what is also needed is that the other should be relatively less so.
Discussion as to why this has to be the case will be postponed until Corollary 2. A
consequence of the Gnding is that, for more desirable coordination to be achieved,
mutual knowledge of the game might su!ce [4]; in any case, the common knowl-
edge e!cient outcome can never be achievable. Indeed, for example in state (1, 0),
at the equilibrium (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) players would choose the action proGle (B; A), while at
(∗∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) the proGle (A; A).
It is worth noticing that the conditions in the above proposition entail a whole class
of new equilibria, indeed an inGnite number. This is formally stated by the following
Corollary.
Corollary 1. If conditions in point (1) of Proposition 2 hold then any pair of strate-
gies t
∗
i =
∑
t=0;:::; t∗ It(ti), with i= I; II, is a NE of the GEMG. If conditions in point
(2) of Proposition 2 hold, then any pair of strategies t
∗+1
I =
∑
t=0;:::; t∗+1 It(tI) and
t
∗
II =
∑
t=0;:::; t∗ It(tII) is a NE of the GEMG, where t
∗=0; 1; 2; : : :
In words, under the set up of Proposition 2 there exist equilibria where agents
coordinate e!ciently when either both observe at least t∗ + 1 messages, or I sends
at least t∗ + 2 and II at least t∗ + 1 messages. However, waiting for a high number
of messages to coordinate on B does not seem to be a natural and intuitive way to
proceed. Although we shall discuss the issue in the next paragraph, we Gnd proper to
anticipate here that in case of an inGnite number of equilibria, considerations concerning
their ex ante e6ciency may be useful to formalise the above observation.
De!nition 1. Let tI; tII = 1; 2; : : :. By z(I; II) =P(tII = tI − 1|tI) = I=[I + II(1 − I)]
we deGne the probability that player II’s type is tI− 1, conditionally to player I’s type
being tI. By z′(I; II) =P(tI = tII|tII) = II=[II + I(1 − II)] we deGne the probability
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that player I’s type is tII, conditionally to player II’s type being tII. If I = = II then
we shall write z(I; II) = z() and z′(I; II) = z′().
Having given the above deGnition we can now state the following corollary.
Corollary 2. (1) If II¿(1−q)I=q(1−I) and I¡q then z(I; II)¡q and z′(I; II)¿q.
(2) If I¿(1− q)II=(1− II)q and II¡q then z′(I; II)¡q and z(I; II)¿q.
Proof. Manipulation of the inequality II¿(1 − q)I=q(1 − I) leads to I=[I + (1 −
I)II] = z(I; II)¡q and to z′(I; II)¿q, while manipulating I¿(1 − q)II=(1 − II)q
implies II=[II + (1− II)I] = z′(I; II)¡q and z(I; II)¿q.
The above result makes explicit the very conceptual reason for players to choose
B when ti¿1; i= I; II. Take, for example, point (1) and consider I at tI = 1; at that
type she is uncertain as to whether tII = 0 or tII = 1. If II plays ∗∗II , then I knows that
II can either choose A, with probability z(I; II), or B with probability (1− z(I; II)).
More explicitly, from the point of view of I it is as if II, in Gb, is playing the “mixed
strategy” (z(I; II); 1 − z(I; II)) with the obvious interpretational qualiGcation that
z(I; II) is a technological rather than behavioural parameter. 2 Hence, playing B with
probability one is optimal for I if and only if the “mixed strategy” z(I; II) is no
greater than the probability with which A is chosen according to the mixed strategy
NE, namely q. Analogous considerations would hold for point (2). If I = = II, then
z()= 1=(2 − )= z′()¿1=2 and the above requisites are never satisGed. Rubinstein
hints at this last point as the crucial one in the EMG inducing coordination failure
at game Gb. As q¡1=2, the analysis pursued indicates that 1 − z(I; II)¿1=2 (1 −
z′(I; II)¿1=2) is certainly a necessary, however, not a su!cient condition for the
pairs (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) and (
∗∗∗
I ; 
∗∗
II ) to be equilibria in the GEMG; indeed, it has to be that
(1− z(I; II))¿(1− q)¿1=2; (1− z′(I; II)¿(1− q)¿1=2).
Below we are going to see that these conditions are in fact much more meaningful;
in particular, they provide a full characterisation for the pair (∗I ; 
∗
II) to be the unique
NE of the GEMG.
Proposition 3. The pair (∗I ; 
∗
II) is the unique NE of the GEMG if and only if
z(I; II)¿q and z′(I; II)¿q.
Proof. As for su!ciency, let t∗I¿1 and t
∗
II¿1 be the lowest types respectively, such
that I(t∗I )¡1 and II(t
∗
II)¡1 at a NE. Then it is either t
∗
I − 1= t∗II or t∗I = t∗II. In
both cases, by the reasoning followed in the proof of Proposition 2, it is that ei-
ther z(I; II)6q or z′(I; II)6q. Assume instead z(I; II)¿q and z′(I; II)¿q; then
no NE can accommodate players choosing B with strictly positive probability at some
type.
2 Notice that the function z too could be seen as chosen by players, when able to control the error
probability messages of the communication protocol. However, also under this interpretation z would not be
determined unilaterally but rather jointly by both agents.
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Clearly, (∗I ; 
∗
II) is always a NE of the GMEG; therefore, Proposition 3 is also
suggesting that the communication technology could be thought of as a (possibly
ine!cient) device to select among multiple equilibria. Furthermore, the relevant (for
the analysis) interplay between payo6s (in particular the mixed strategy equilibrium)
in Gb and technology is now completely clear and, what is more, crucial for e!-
cient coordination. Consequently, as payo6s vary the subset of the unit square space
of technological parameters entailing equilibrium uniqueness (multiplicity) changes. In
particular, as M→ 1 the area inducing multiple equilibria shrinks as a result of the fact
that action A, in this case, “tends to become” a weakly dominating strategy. Instead,
if M→L, then q→ (L− 1)=(2L− 1); since q is increasing in M this expression deter-
mines an upper bound for the multiple equilibria area. This is because when M→L
coordination on B is most attractive; as a result, there is a stronger incentive to do so.
An alternative interpretation of this could be in terms of risk dominance. As M→L
the proGle (A; A) clearly remains risk dominant in Gb; the extent of its dominance,
however, decreases as M increases. The same type of interpretative key might also be
used when L→∞, which implies q→ 0; in this case coordination on B becomes, in a
sense, in9nitely risky with the area of multiplicity tending to disappear. However, this
is true when M and L are not related; clearly, in general this may not be so. Indeed,
for example, suppose L= aM , with a¿1 and Gnite; then q= [(L=a)−1]=[(L=a)+L−1]
so that as L gets large q→ 1=(a + 1) and the above conclusion would evidently no
longer hold.
Before discussing e!ciency it is interesting to identify the unique NE with mixed
strategies at all tI; tII¿1 for both players.
2.3. Ex ante e6ciency
As the GEMG has multiple equilibria under the conditions of Proposition 2 it is
interesting to briePy investigate their ex ante e!ciency. We shall do so by Grst com-
paring players’ expected payo6s at (∗I ; 
∗
II) with that of alternative equilibria and then
discuss possible rankings of equilibria based on their relative e!ciency.
As far as the Grst point is concerned it is worth dwelling shortly on the matter
since, in principle, it is not obvious that (∗I ; 
∗
II) is ex-ante Pareto inferior to equilibria
with coordination on B, at some non-zero type. For example, to be more explicit,
(∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) induces e!cient coordination at all states except state (1, 0) where, in Gb,
player II chooses A and I chooses B getting the lowest stage game payo6 of −L.
Coordination failure at that state can, in a sense, be interpreted as a price paid by
I to enhance coordination when the number of exchanged messages is higher. Since
player I receives −L with probability pI, intuitively she is willing to bear the risk of
losses at state (1, 0) only if I is su!ciently low. For (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) to be Pareto superior
to (∗I ; 
∗
II) we would expect a similar condition to hold. Below we show that this is
indeed true and that, moreover, the upper bound q for I su!ces.
Proposition 4. If (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) or (
∗∗∗
I ; 
∗∗
II ) are NE of the GEMG then (
∗
I ; 
∗
II) is not
ex ante Pareto optimal.
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Proof. Let Ei (I; II) be player i’s expected payo6 when players choose I and II,
respectively. Then,
EI(∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) = (1− p)M − pIL+ p(1− I)IIM + p(1− I)(1− II)IM
+p(1− I)2(1− II)IIM
+p(1− I)2(1− II)2IM + · · · = M − pI(L+M)
while
EI(∗I ; 
∗
II) = (1− p)M:
Hence EI(∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II )¿EI(
∗
I ; 
∗
II) if and only if I¡M=(L+M). By the same reasoning
we have that EII(∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II )¿EII(
∗
I ; 
∗
II) for all 0¡I; II¡1; since for (
∗∗
I ; 
∗∗
II ) to
be an equilibrium it must be M=(M + L)¿q¿I the result follows.
Consider now (∗∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ); in this case player II’s expected payo6 will be
EII(∗∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) = (1− p)M + pI0− p(1− I)IIL+ p(1− I)(1− II)IM
+p(1− I)2(1− II)IIM + p(1− I)2(1− II)2IM + · · ·
and EII(∗∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II )¿EII(
∗
I ; 
∗
II) if and only if II¡M=(L+M). Since for (
∗∗∗
I ; 
∗∗
II )
to be an equilibrium it must be II¡q¡M=(L + M) the result follows. Finally,
EI(∗∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II )¿EI(
∗
I ; 
∗
II) and the statement is proved.
The above proposition simply says that reaching an ex-ante (self-sustaining) agree-
ment on both of them playing B, even when a minimal number of messages is ex-
changed (according to the deGnition of ∗∗I and 
∗∗
II ), is always beneGcial to the players.
Moreover, equilibria, induced by the conditions of Proposition 2 and in which agents
wait for a higher number of messages before coordinating on B are less preferable,
by the players, to either (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) or (
∗∗∗
I ; 
∗∗
II ). Hence, in so far as e!ciency is
concerned, there appears to be a natural ranking suggesting players to coordinate on a
low number of messages sent, depending upon the relative machines reliability. This is
what observations on how people interact in reality seem to suggest; based on this we
can say that e!ciency is an explicit or implicit criterion used by individuals in order
to select from among multiple equilibria. To the extent that failure message probabil-
ities allow so, players’ coordination on B achieved by economising on the number of
exchanged messages is simply more ex ante e!cient.
2.4. Type-dependent technology
Let us now consider a very general case where i : T − {0}→ [0; 1], so that
i(t) is computer Ci message error probability at its t-th message, with i= I; II. The
uniqueness result can now be generalised, in full analogy with Proposition 3, as
follows.
Proposition 5. The pair (∗I ; 
∗
II) is the unique NE of the GEMG if and only if
mint¿1 zt¿q and mint¿1 z′t¿q where zt = z(I(t); II(t))= I(t)=[I(t)+II(t)(1−I(t))]
and z′t = z
′(I(t); II(t))= II(t)=[II(t) + I(t + 1)(1− II(t))].
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This general framework is now capable to encompass Rubinstein’s result on the
possibility of coordination over B, when a commonly known maximum number of
messages is imposed. In particular if N¿1 is the sum of messages sent by both
machines, then N = tI + tII; letting tI = t it is either N =2t − 1 if N is odd, or N =2t
when N is even, with t¿1.
Corollary 3 (Rubinstein [13]). (i) (N odd) Let I(t)= , with 0¡¡1, for t¡(N +
1)=2; I((N + 1)=2)=1 and I(t)∈ [0; 1] for t¿(N + 1)=2; moreover let II(t)=  for
t¡(N + 1)=2 and II(t)∈ [0; 1] for t¿(N + 1)=2. Then if ¡q the pair of strategies
((N+1)=2I ; 
(N−1)=2
II ), where 
k
i =
∑
t¡k It(ti) +
∑
t¿k i(t)It(ti) for t=0; 1; 2; : : : ; k =1;
2 : : : and 0i = It(ti)+
∑
t¿0 i (t)It(ti), with i(t)∈ [0; 1], is a NE of the GEMG. (ii) (N
even) Let I(t)=  for t6N=2, and I(t)∈ [0; 1] for t¿N=2; moreover, let II(t)=  for
t¡N=2; II(N=2)=1 and II(t)∈ [0; 1] for t¿N=2. Then if ¡q, the pair of strategies
((N=2)I ; 
(N=2)
II ) is a NE of the GEMG.
The general principle underlying the above result is as before. For example, consider
N¿1 odd; the condition ¡q is in fact z′(N−1)=2¡q as z
′
(N−1)=2 =p(1− )N−2=[p(1−
)N−2 + p(1− )N−1]= . The same reasoning holds for N even; analogously, in that
case, is z(N=2) = . Intuitively, failure with probability one of a message entails, at a
certain type, the possibility for either zt or z′t to be strictly lower than the probability of
choosing A according to the mixed strategy NE, which would otherwise be precluded
because of the equality of probabilities.
3. A model with equal error probabilities: the Intermediated Electronic Mail Game
(IEMG)
In this section, we shall investigate a further extension of the EMG to exemplify
a possible interpretation, as well as an implementation, of the main results presented
in Proposition 2 when, like in Rubinstein, players commonly know that message error
probabilities are equal. We proceed by showing that a simple generalization of the
basic communication protocol can, in this case, still entail e!cient coordination.
Introduce s computers, CI+1; : : : ; CI+s, “between CI and C′′II and k computers,
CII+1; : : : ; CII+k , “between CII and C′′I , with s; k =0; 1; 2; : : :, in the way that we specify
below; hence, on the overall, in the framework there will now be s+ k +2 computers.
We shall henceforth indicate by X the set of these machines. Moreover, let notation
(Ci; Cj), with i = j and Ci ∈X; Cj ∈X , represent the communication connection (chan-
nel) between Ci and Cj. In the pair, Ci always indicates the computer starting the
communication, namely the one sending the very initial message between the two.
Consider now the following communication protocol. If nature chooses state a then
CI sends no message to CI+1. If nature chooses b then CI automatically sends a message
to CI+1. If CI+1 receives a message then it automatically sends a message to CI+2. If
CI+2 receives a message from CI+1 then it sends a message to CI+3 and so on until the
message will reach (if ever) CII. If CII receives the information from CI through the
above s + 1 channels, it then automatically replies by sending a message to CII+1. If
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CII+1 receives the message it will automatically send another one to CII+2 and so on up
to when (if ever) CI receives the conGrmation message, through k + 1 passages, sent
by CII. The procedure then continues in the same fashion until, with probability one, it
stops. Messages are independent and each with the same failure probability 1¿¿0.
Hence, there are s+k+2 connections; namely (CI; CI+1); : : : ; (CI+s; CII); (CII; CII+1);
: : : ; (CII+k ; CI). In words, the informational exchange between CI and CII is akin to
that in the EMG in so far as the fundamental goal behind the communication Pow is
concerned (i.e. that the two players’ machines try to communicate with each other)
and on the fact that error probabilities are equal; the only di6erence here is given by
the presence of s+ k intermediating machines. We call this variation the Intermediated
Electronic Mail Game (IEMG).
Below we will show that, despite equal error probabilities, within this scheme mul-
tiple and e!cient equilibria could indeed emerge. However, prior to stating the main
result we formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In the IEMG it is z()=P(tII = 0|tI = 1)= [1−(1−)s+1]=[1−(1−)s+k+2].
Moreover, (i) if (s + 1)=(s + k + 2)¿q, the equation z()= q has no solution in the
interval (0; 1) while (ii) if (s+ 1)=(s+ k + 2)¡q, the equation z()= q has a unique
solution = ∗ in the interval (0; 1).
Proof. We start noticing that now
z() = P(tII = 0|tI = 1) = p[+ (1− ) + · · ·+ (1− )s]=
(p[+ (1− ) + · · ·+ (1− )s]
+p(1− )s+1[+ (1− ) + · · ·+ (1− )k ])
= [1− (1− )s+1]=([1− (1− )s+1] + (1− )s+1[1− (1− )k+1])
= [1− (1− )s+1]=[1− (1− )s+k+2]
and
dz()=d=Dz() = [(s+ 1)(1− )s[1− (1− )s+k+2]
− [1− (1− )s+1](s+ k + 2)(1− )s+k+1]=[1− (1− )s+k+2]2;
which implies Dz()¿(6)0 if and only if
(s+ 1)[1− (1− )s+k+2]¿(6)[1− (1− )s+1](s+ k + 2)(1− )k+1
if and only if
g() = z()(1− )k+16(¿)(s+ 1)=(s+ k + 2):
Furthermore, notice that z() (as well as g()) is continuous and di6erentiable in ,
that
z(0) = (s+ 1)=(s+ k + 2); z(1) = 1 (1)
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and
g(0) = z(0); g(1) = 0:
(i) Suppose z(0)= (s+ 1)=(s+ k + 2)¿q.
(a) We Grst prove that if z(0)= q, then Dz()¿0 for small enough . Indeed, if
not, for some such  it would be z()6z(0) and Dz()60, namely g()= z()(1 −
)k+1¿z(0), which is impossible since z()(1− )k+1¡z(0). (b) Assume now z()= q
has a solution in (0,1). Then, there must exist an  in (0,1) such that z()= q and
Dz()60. This implies g()= q(1− )k+1¿z(0), contradicting the initial assumption.
(ii) Suppose z(0)= (s+1)=(s+k+2)¡q. Then, by formula (1) above, there must be
an 0¡∗¡1 such that z(∗)= q and Dz(∗)¿0. We now show that such ∗ is unique.
(a) We Grst prove that there can be at most one 0¡′¡1 such that z(′)= q and
Dz(′)= 0. Indeed, should there be two, say ′ and ′′, with ′ = ′′, it would then be
g(′)= z(0)= g(′′), namely q(1− ′)k+1 = q(1− ′′)k+1 which is impossible.
(b) Suppose such ′ in (0,1) exists. Then (a) implies that for all  in (0; ′), such
that z()= q that Dz()¡0 and that for all  in (′; 1) such that z()= q that Dz()¿0.
Hence two cases are possible. Either ′ is the unique  in (0,1) such that z()= q and
Dz()¿0, and the result follows, or else there is one ′′ in (′; 1) such that z(′′)= q
and Dz(′′)¿0. But if this is so, then there exists an  in (′; ′′) such that z()¡q
and Dz()¡0, and thus z()(1 − )k+1¿z(0). But this leads to a contradiction since
z()(1− )k+1¡z(′)(1− ′)k+1 = z(0). Hence, in this case, ′= ∗.
(c) Assume now that for no  in (0,1) is z()= q and Dz()= 0. Then, that ∗ is
unique follows immediately. Indeed, if not there exists ∗∗ such that ∗¡∗∗, z(∗∗)= q
and Dz(∗∗)¡0. But then g(∗)= q(1−∗)k+1¡z(0) and g(∗∗)= q(1−∗∗)k+1¿z(0);
a contradiction.
To make explicit the link with Gndings in Proposition 2, we now state the main
results of this section as a reformulation, in terms of the number of intermediaries,
of the conditions appearing in points (1) and (2) of that Proposition which entail the
strategy pairs (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) and (
∗∗∗
I ; 
∗∗
II ) to be NE of the IEMG.
Proposition 6. In the IEMG, z= z()¡q if and only if (s + 1)=(s + k + 2)¡q and
¡∗.
Proof. Su6ciency. Assume (s+1)=(s+k+2)¡q and ¡∗; that z()¡q follows from
Lemma 1.
Necessity: If z()¡q then again from Lemma 1, (s + 1)=(s + k + 2)¡q and
¡∗.
From Proposition 6 we could see now that for the pair (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) to be an equilibrium
the number of intermediaries, in having to satisfy the inequality (s+1)=(s+ k +2)¡q
(with ¡∗), must be related in such a way that k¿s(1 − q)=q + (1 − 2q)=q. The
interpretation is simple; player I is willing to run the risk of paying the cost of mis-
coordination (at state (1, 0)) if k is su6ciently higher than s, again with the di6erence
being governed by the game payo6s. Indeed, given that all computers have the same
, the appropriate asymmetry on the failure probabilities of messages from I to II and
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viceversa, could be obtained by introducing a well-deGned number of intermediaries.
Finally, it is worth noticing that if s=0, the nonlinearity characterising the dependence
of  on q tends to disappear as k gets large, with z() taking a particularly simple form.
This is formalised by the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Suppose s=0; then in the IEMG the pair of strategies (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) is a
Nash Equilibrium of the IEMG if and only if z()= =[1− (1− )k+2]¡q. As k→∞
the condition tends to be to z()= ¡q.
The previous result show that (∗∗I ; 
∗∗
II ) is precluded, in equilibrium, when k¡s
(1 − q)=q + (1 − 2q)=q. This, however, does not mean that further equilibria other
than the Rubinstein’s, would be impossible. The following proposition indeed conGrms
this.
Proposition 7. In the IEMG, z′()=P(tI = 1|tII = 1)¡q if and only if (k + 1)=(s +
k+2)¡q and ¡∗∗, where (when (k+1)=(s+ k+2)¡q)∗∗ is the unique  in (0,1)
such that z′()= q, and Dz′()¿0.
Proof. Proceeds in analogy with that of Proposition 6.
4. Conclusions
We believe that a main conclusion delivered by this paper is that in the Electronic
Mail Game e!cient coordination can be attained when the technological parameters
governing the reliability of communication channels and the payo6 structure of the
coordination games to be played are appropriately related. In particular, the mixed
strategy Nash Equilibrium will play a decisive role in calibrating machines reliability
and, in equilibrium, will represent the crucial dividing line between the possibility of
e!cient and ine!cient coordination. Such results appear to suggest what we consider
to be the other main (general) consideration, to our knowledge still to be investigated
in more articulated frameworks, that imperfect communication networks (not leading
to common knowledge of the relevant games) set up with the aim of inducing proper
coordination must have well-deGned and commonly known characteristics of reliability,
explicitly linked to the payo6 structure of the game(s). The intuition is that imperfect
communication systems, generating uncertainty on the opponents’ types, induce (meta)
second-order lotteries on the (Grst-order mixed) strategies available to players. Then,
at an equilibrium, it is not surprising to Gnd that for desirable coordination to occur
the reliability of communication channels should be above a certain critical threshold
connected to the payo6s of the relevant game via the mixed strategy equilibrium. This
is because, in the game, support to personal beliefs formation is provided by message
failure probabilities.
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